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Friendship for the Flawed:
A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
University of Louisville
Abstract: When considering the value of friendship, most philosophers 
ignore the negatives.  Most assume that humans need friends to fl ourish, 
and some argue that friendships can be good, no matter the risks entailed. 
This makes conversations about the value of friendship one-sided.  Here, 
I argue that Cynics and Pessimists have an important view on friendship, 
despite it being ignored.  They hold that: (a) friendship is unnecessary 
for fl ourishing, and (b) friendship presents ethical risks, especially to 
one’s own self-suffi ciency.  I defend these views.  Then I conclude with 
refl ections on why Cynics and Pessimists actually make great friends.  By 
helping people to focus on vulgar human nature and the fl aws that humans 
have, they create an unpretentious basis for friendship.
Cicero writes, “For when fortune smiles on us, friendship adds a luster to 
that smile; when she frowns, friendship absorbs her part and share of that 
frown, and thus makes it easier to bear” (1991, p.  88).1  No one denies 
that friendship makes life better.  But maybe that is a problem.  Maybe 
most philosophers addressing friendship are guilty of confi rmation bias, 
seeking only opinions that prove themselves right about the positive value 
of friendship.2
However, it is a big philosophical leap from recognizing friendship’s 
frequent benefi ts to deeming it necessary for fl ourishing or good apart 
from moral evaluation.  Yet many authors do just that.  They affi rm that 
friendship is necessary for a good life (e.g. Aristotle, 2002; Sherman, 
1993).  Or they argue that friendships have their own type of goodness 
that can exist even in morally compromising situations (e.g. Cocking and 
Kennett, 2000).  These two evaluations puzzle me because they seem 
selective in their focus.
I want to argue against these prevalent trends in the friendship 
literature by taking an intermediary position.  It involves defending two 
things.  First, while friendship often helps someone fl ourish, it should 
not be thought necessary for fl ourishing for all people (contra Aristotle). 
Second, the value of friendship cannot be separated from its moral risks, 
especially to our own characters (contra Cocking and Kennett).3
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These ideas come from unlikely sources of wisdom on friendship: 
Cynics and Pessimists.  Taken together, Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of 
Thebes, and Arthur Schopenhauer present a view of friendship that 
is honest to human fl aws.  I put them in dialogue here because their 
philosophical styles are similar, and almost no other philosophers warn 
against friendship like they do.  I will argue that their view shows that 
(1) philosophers are mistaken if they consider friendship necessary for 
fl ourishing for all, and (2) friendship always imposes risk to your character 
and sometimes entails burdensome social obligations.4  I will conclude by 
arguing that Cynics and Pessimists show us how to be good friends.  To do 
this, I will (a) set up the two puzzles about friendship that I mentioned here 
and (b) argue that the combined Cynic and Pessimist view can solve them. 
My point is not that friendship is bad or that we should be misanthropes.5 
The point is that we should feel ambivalent.  Most good things in life are 
not just good; they are usually complicated.  Friendship is one such good, 
and that is why I think we should listen to these neglected voices.6
Challenge 1: You Need Friends to Live Well
Aristotle set the agenda for philosophizing about friendship.  Yet tragedy 
looms in his theory.  On the one hand, humans are naturally political 
beings, living together with others (1984b, I.2).  We have friends and seek 
associations.  Aristotle explains why, “The presence of friends, then, seems 
desirable in all circumstances” (1984a, IX.11 [emphasis added]).  Friendship 
helps us.  Friends make misfortune bearable, and without them, the most 
blessed pursuits become arduous (1984a, IX.9-10).  For Aristotle, friendship 
is not merely ornamental; it is necessary for fl ourishing.  Without friendship, 
life is incomplete.
On the other hand, Aristotle realizes the diffi culty of making friends, 
claiming that people cannot make excellent friends with many others. 
Having a few friends is the best we should hope for (1984a, IX.10).7 
Becoming a good person is diffi cult, so fi nding another good person to 
venture through life with is twice as hard.  There is challenge not only on 
our own singular journeys toward virtue and fl ourishing, but there is added 
challenge in fi nding worthy others to befriend, especially virtuous people 
who like you and make time for you.8  And if we cannot to do this, we are 
not fully fl ourishing.  Friendship and fl ourishing therefore depend on luck 
by relying on other people, an unsurprising conclusion for anyone familiar 
with Aristotle.  Flourishing, for him, just is diffi cult, and it is subject to mis/
fortune.9  But human animals simply need friendships to live well, no matter 
their scarcity or diffi culty to cultivate (see: Nussbaum, 2009, ch. 12).
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The Cynics challenged Aristotle’s view.10  The reason Cynics can 
deny the necessity of friendship is that the goal of philosophical training 
is to make people self-suffi cient in living a simple and natural life.  This, 
in turn, renders the fl ourishing person completely invulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of life.  Their training program focused on self-mastery. 
Cynics disciplined their bodies through exercise, and they ignored all 
academic subjects except ethics.  They cultivated themselves through 
simple living: eating only enough to survive, wearing only a single cloak, 
and sleeping wherever they could.  Diogenes of Sinope’s diet of onions 
and residency inside a barrel were not gimmicks; they were exercises 
of his philosophical commitment to a natural, simple life.11 This is why 
the Cynics lashed out at wealth and reputation, and why they confronted 
anyone who thought or taught otherwise.  Their entire lives were efforts to 
live the best life possible and to show others that they, too, could fl ourish, 
if only they abandoned the complications and anxieties of decadence (see: 
Hard, 2012, s. 96-118).
Just like any external good (e.g. health, wealth, or reputation), 
friendship could never be a necessary good for fl ourishing for the Cynics. 
Friends, like any good thing in life, are just part of the journey to become 
self-suffi cient.  And friends do not always contribute to that.  Diogenes was 
plain, “[H]appiness is this and nothing else, to be of truly good heart and 
never distressed, wherever one is and whatever the moment may bring” 
(Hard, 2012, s. 106b).  There is no mention of wealth, reputation, or others 
(contra Aristotle, 1984a, I).  And friends are important only insofar as they 
help in this pursuit.  Diogenes emphasizes, “[T]o come off well in life, one 
needs either good friends or ardent enemies; for friends instruct you, and 
enemies expose your faults” (Hard, 2012, s. 297).12  On the journey toward 
self-suffi ciency and simplicity, enemies do just as well as friends because 
they expose your shortcomings.  The only important thing is that you learn 
to improve yourself, that you become self-suffi cient and live simply.
The Cynics rebelled against Aristotle’s concept of fl ourishing.  They 
agreed that fl ourishing involves rigorous training of the self.  But they 
disagreed that fl ourishing relies on friendship or community.  Whatever 
price they pay in a simple life, they receive a mode of fl ourishing that 
can be accomplished by anyone, anywhere, in any circumstances.  On 
the Cynic account, a friendless person could still fl ourish.  I could see 
them advising a downtrodden, friendless Aristotelian by saying, “You are 
dissatisfi ed with life and fortune precisely because you have the wrong 
view of fl ourishing.”  Cynics would say that friends are indeed hard to fi nd 
and make.  But rather than bemoan this, they would offer it as evidence 
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for why friendships should not be included as a necessary component of 
fl ourishing.  You should not be afraid of lacking friends.13  After all, some 
are satisfi ed with solitude and independence.  Instead, the Cynics would 
say that you should fear living a decadent life that makes you depend on 
other people or that threatens your ability to comport yourself well toward 
the simple joys of life.  Friends might not contribute to this.  In fact, they 
might hinder it.  So, they cannot be necessary.
Challenge 2: Good Friends Help You Move House;
Great Friends Help You Move a Body
Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett say that you would be a good friend to 
someone by helping them move a body, like the plot of Death in Brunswick 
(1990) where Dean helps his friend Carl hide the body of a person he 
kills.  For them, friendship only has a contingent connection to morality.14 
Even friendships that compromise your moral standing might properly 
be called “true and good” (2000, p. 279).  Friendships are relationships 
that have mutual affection, commitments to each other’s interests and 
wellbeing, desires for shared experiences, a disposition to be directed by 
the other person’s interests and activities, and mutual conceptions and 
interpretations of the self.  None of this need be connected to morality. 
To them, friends helping each other hide a body might be morally 
compromising but nonetheless indicative of a true and good friendship 
(2000, sec. III).  They therefore expunge questions of the moral value of 
friendship from questions about the quality of its constitution.
What makes Cocking and Kennett’s thesis so controversial is that 
the friendship literature leans Aristotelian.  Aristotelians claim that true 
friendships are those where people are interested in each other’s ethical 
characters and fl ourishing.  And any friendship that jeopardizes either is, 
by defi nition, not the best form of friendship and so cannot be assessed as 
a true or good.15
I see the Cynics as an intermediary between these two camps.  With 
Aristotle, they agreed that friendship should be evaluated primarily in 
ethical terms.  But they also shared the caution and negative focus of 
Cocking and Kennett in considering morally compromising situations. 
Rather than focus on the benefi ts of friendship, the Cynics often warn 
against aligning yourself with people of questionable character.  Diogenes 
said, “How absurd it is that when we are intending to set off on a voyage, 
we care to select the best travelling-companions, and yet, when we have 
resolved to live well, we choose whomever chance sets in our path as 
our companions in life” (Hard, 2012, s. 300).  Rather than separating 
 
203
A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship
friendship from ethical evaluation, the Cynics warn that friendships can 
have negative impacts.  They notice that people often settle for befriending 
those they meet by chance, rather than actively seeking out others with 
similar moral commitments.  This is curious to them because people 
scrutinize less serious affairs, such as travelling, more than they scrutinize 
their own choices of friends, who can infl uence every facet of life.16
The Cynics did not take friendship lightly.  Not only does it affect your 
own journey toward self-suffi ciency, but it also comes with obligations. 
They argued that friends must stick up for each other and, if they do 
not, they are as bad as anyone maligning the friend (Hard, 2012, s. 304). 
Schopenhauer adds to this insight, arguing that ‘friends’ often try to loan 
money from you, and the more intimate a person is, the more likely he is to 
transgress the bounds of propriety to take advantage of you, insult you, or 
generally be rude (1902, §28).17  Schopenhauer also observes that people 
often live their entire lives, including friendships, with ulterior motives or 
personal interests that they keep secret.  ‘Friends’ do not actually share the 
innermost aspects of themselves, which are sometimes the driver behind 
their lives.  He even jokes that ‘friends’ talk badly about each other behind 
each other’s backs and that, if you ever heard what your ‘friends’ said about 
you, you would stop talking to them (§33).  These comments highlight 
that befriending anyone presents moral risk and burden.  In associating 
yourself with someone, you associate yourself with who they are, what 
they do, and what they value.  For Cynics, this is dangerous because it 
can compromise your self-suffi ciency.  And for Pessimists, it is a risk that 
might not be worth the labor because ‘friends’ keep signifi cant secrets 
from each other and are not so friendly when they leave the room.
The Cynics and Pessimists agree with Aristotle that friends impact the 
ethical quality of your life, but not always, or even usually, in a positive way. 
Rather, they can distract you from self-suffi ciency and create obligations. 
Friendships take work.  And given that life is diffi cult, they might be 
unworth the effort.  Cynics and Pessimists take this ethical risk seriously. 
And insofar as friendships jeopardize your character or self-suffi ciency, 
you are better off without them.  Not only, then, are there practical worries 
about how diffi cult it is to make friends, as the fi rst challenge suggests. 
But there are also ethical worries about the risks entailed.  For Cynics 
and Pessimists, it is often the case that having no friends is better than 
having bad (or even mediocre) ones.  Enemies, after all, will do the most 
important tasks that a friend might.  And there is no shortage of them.
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Cynics and Pessimists Make the Best Friends
I have argued two things: (1) friends are not necessary for fl ourishing 
for all people, and (2) friends present moral risks.  But none of what I 
have argued on behalf of the Cynics and Pessimists implies that they 
are committed to being callous.  Instead, the opposite is the case.  Two 
stories about the Cynic Crates of Thebes bear repeating, as they show that 
Cynics and Pessimists often make fantastic friends.  First, Crates heard 
that Metrocles of Maroneia was going to kill himself.  Metrocles was an 
Aristotelian, holding that reputation matters for living a good life, and 
he had ruined his by farting while giving a lecture.  Ashamed, Metrocles 
shut himself in to starve himself to death.  Crates went to Metrocles and 
tried to convince him that he did nothing wrong, as it was natural to fart. 
Whenever his words failed to convince Metrocles, Crates farted in front 
of him, thus showing that it was not shameful to fart while discussing 
philosophy.  Metrocles recovered from his melancholy and consequently 
became a Cynic (Hard, 2012, s. 459).  Second, Hipparchia of Maroneia, 
Metrocles’ sister, fell in love with Crates.  She ignored all other suitors, 
and she threatened to kill herself if her family forbade her from marrying 
him.  The family spoke with Crates, requesting that he change her mind. 
Crates agreed, went to Hipparchia, and argued that she should not marry 
him.  She remained unconvinced, however.  So, he stripped naked and 
said, “Here is your bridegroom, here are his possessions, make your 
choice accordingly; for you will be no fi t companion for me if you do not 
share the same way of life” (Hard, 2012, s. 455).  He expected his display 
of poverty and aged nakedness to stop her pursuit of him.  Instead, she 
matched his mode of dress and committed her life to Cynicism.
What can we draw from these stories?  It would be incorrect to say 
that the Cynics did not make friends.  Crates married and had friends, and 
they mutually supported each other in efforts to live the Cynic philosophy. 
But what separated his friendships from others (and probably from many 
of ours) is that he emphasized that the deepest, most intimate connections 
we have with people ought to be natural, unashamedly displaying human 
vulgarity and imperfection.  Flattery, or even rhetorical dressing of human 
vulnerabilities, never serves friendship.  Rather, being comfortable about 
natural functions and being open about human fl aws do.  Schopenhauer 
offered similar advice for living with other people.  Whenever you meet 
people, look at them and accept them for who they are—peculiar, immoral, 
or dim as they may be.  Do not scorn them or hope that they will change, 
unjustly making their lives harder.  Instead, consider who they actually are 
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and interact with them accordingly (1902, §21).  Schopenhauer did not 
want to interact with many people, but he understood it took many types 
to live in this world, and they deserve to be as they are too.
Cynics and Pessimists warn us about high-minded ideals of 
fl ourishing; they refocus us on self-suffi ciency and cultivating our own 
characters.  And their remarks on friendship do the same.  The Cynic and 
the Pessimist both say that we should accept people’s fl aws and natural 
ways of being, rather than ignoring them or hoping them to be something 
else.  Whenever you look at a person for who they actually are, then you 
can understand the ways they might fi t into your life.  This does not mean 
that you must befriend them.  But it means that you have a better idea of 
what a friendship with them would be.  Most people let their hopes, fears, 
and desires distort the reality of relationships.  We see what we want or 
fear more often than reality.
I am not a Cynic or a Pessimist.  But I think they have central points 
about friendship right and have been ignored for too long.  Friendship is 
not always good, and, in fact, it can present grave risk and generate heavy 
obligations.  To separate the moral evaluation of friendship from the quality 
of the friendship is a mistake, otherwise it is not worthy of the title “true and 
good friendship.”  And such a risky endeavor as friendship should not be 
necessary for fl ourishing for all people.  Cynics and Pessimists understand 
that we crave friendship, but they also understand that deep friendships 
are not always possible in every circumstance in life.  Rather than take this 
as evidence that friendless people cannot fl ourish, Cynics and Pessimists 
encourage all to work on self-suffi ciency and simplicity in living, which 
more surely lead to fl ourishing.  They reveal that having no friends is 
better than having bad ones.  And they savor the friendships that they do 
have when they have them.  This fl aws-fi rst approach to relationships—
farts and wrinkles and all on display—creates a more human/e basis for 
friendships.  Sometimes, we need that Cynical or Pessimistic friend to 
remind us that our expectations are too high, and that if we leave behind 
pristine ideals for natural reality, we can be happy.  In dire straits, we need 
friends like Cynics and Pessimists.  They nudge our vision away from our 
failures to live up to heavenly ideals and retrain our vision on the fl awed 
here, the imperfect self, and the ways that accepting our human simplicity 
will serve us better than anything else.18
 
206
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
Notes
 1 When citing the Cynics, I will draw exclusively from Robin Hard’s 
anthology and translations, and I will give the saying number rather than the page 
number because it is more precise.  Most times, his main reference text is G. 
Giannantoni’s Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae. 
 2 Due to space constraints, I cannot fully address what friendship is, which 
is separate from my primary concern of what friendship’s value is.  The two 
questions are related but distinct. 
 3 Oddly enough, not many philosophers address the risks of friendships in 
detail.  Aristotle tries to distinguish virtuous friendships from less virtuous types, 
but the goal is to identify the best forms, not warn of the risks (1984a, VII-IX). 
(Bernard Williams, 1981, pp. 15-6, makes this same observation when he says 
that Aristotle requires that friendship minimize risks due to his implicit view of 
self-suffi ciency.)  One exception among philosophers is Augustine of Hippo, who 
recalls youthful stories of him stealing things for fun.  But he admits that he would 
not have done it if he were alone.  Instead, his friends added pleasure to the theft 
(1998, II.vii-x; see also: Nawar, 2015).  This leads him to warn readers about 
the company they keep.  A last notable contemporary exception is Alexis Elder 
(2014), who defends an Aristotelian idea that bad people cannot be good friends.
The contemporary aversion to addressing the ills of friendship contrasts with 
common wisdom.  Many I spoke with were able to give sayings about the risks 
of friendship.  Lawyer Dustin Faeder gave me the aphorism, “Lie down with the 
dogs, and you’ll rise up with the fl eas,” which is attributed to Benjamin Franklin. 
Minister Matthew Flores reminded me of the New Testament’s version, “Do not 
be deceived: ‘Bad company corrupts good morals’” (1 Corinthians 15:33 NASB). 
Artistic examples abound too, especially in youth genres.  Philosopher Coleen 
Watson turned my attention to Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, where 
Dumbledore says, “It takes a great deal of bravery to stand up to our enemies, but 
just as much to stand up to our friends.”  And mother Skye Wachtman mentioned 
Pinocchio (1940), where Pinocchio befriends Lampwick, who corrupts him and 
takes him to Pleasure Island, where boys get turned into donkeys for slavery. 
Given the plethora of common advice to be cautious about friendships, the relative 
lack of philosophical warnings is surprising. 
 4 Often, I will call “moral risk” this susceptibility to degradation of your 
character and incurring obligations toward others.  Friendships can affect the 
ethical or moral qualities of your life.  But it is important to distinguish that the 
Cynics and Pessimists mean personal moral risk, about how your character is 
changed or how your projects might become more complicated.  They are not 
concerned with interpersonal risks of, say, giving your friends the wrong advice 
or failing them when they most need you, i.e. the risks that your friends take in 
befriending you and how those affect your friendship. 
 5 Schopenhauer was a misanthrope, as seen in his advice for making friends: 
“And in this view it is advisable to let every one of your acquaintance—whether 
man or woman—feel now and then that you could very well dispense with their 
company” (1902, §28), or again: “For my own part, I should certainly pay more 
respect to an honest dog wagging his tail than to a hundred such [superfi cial] 
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demonstrations of human regard…. The egoism of human nature is so strongly 
antagonistic to any such sympathy, that true friendship belongs to that class 
of things—the sea-serpent, for instance—with regard to which no one knows 
whether they are fabulous or really exist somewhere or other” (§33).  But I think 
there is a way to appreciate his insights on human sociality that does not entail 
misanthropy, or so I hope for this paper. 
 6 I could not fi nd a single work devoted to any Cynic or Pessimist on 
friendship.  I would gladly receive recommendations. 
 7 Aristotle claims that people who live under the rule of tyrannical 
governments cannot make friends with each other (1984a, VIII.11).  This 
introduces not only subjective and social luck, but broader political luck. 
 8 I am assuming here that the social element does not decrease the diffi culty 
of attaining virtue.  Friendships increase the complexity of social relationships and 
external goods; they make things more diffi cult in certain ways.  It does not seem 
that, for Aristotle, having friends makes the paths toward virtue and fl ourishing 
easier.  If we need to lift a heavy rock, more people would be preferable to fewer. 
But if we need to perform surgery, more people might ruin things.  It is unclear 
which metaphor is more appropriate for how sociality affects the feasibility of 
fl ourishing. 
 9 Much of the ancient world reacted against Aristotle’s views on fl ourishing. 
They made fl ourishing too fragile, especially for philosophers desiring more self-
suffi ciency.  Most famously, the Stoics carved up the world into things you can 
control and things you cannot (see: Epictetus, 1983, s. 1).  And friends fi t into the 
category of things you cannot, so they cannot be necessary for fl ourishing.  But 
it is also worth noting that the Stoics wrote many beautiful odes to friendship 
because it still held some non-ethical value to their lives.  Friendship was a good, 
but not one that contributed to fl ourishing (see: Cicero, 1991; Seneca, 1991). 
Even to philosophers who question dependence on social goods, such as the 
Stoics, friendship holds an important place in life.  An interesting complication 
is that Stoics sometimes held ambivalent attitudes toward romantic love, which 
might have parallels here for friendship (see: Cicero, 1927, Bk.  IV). 
 10 I am putting aside interpretive concerns about whether the Cynics represent 
a unifi ed philosophy with positive views.  I assume that they do.  But I would 
gladly entertain critics who would tease apart the different views of different 
Cynics, for example by distinguishing Diogenes from Crates.
Though not a Cynic himself, Theodoros the Atheist expressed something the 
Cynics could have affi rmed.  He rejected friendship based on an observation: 
foolish people have superfi cial relationships that end as soon as the instrumental 
advantages end, and wise people are so self-suffi cient that they do not need friends 
(Hard, 2012, s. 633).  The conclusion: friendship is not necessary for good living. 
Friendship is nice to have, but lacking it will not break anyone. 
 11 The importance of simple living cannot be overemphasized.  Aristotle’s 
view of fl ourishing requires that people live in complex communities.  Whenever 
that happens, people must depend on each other for various things.  The more 
complex a community, the less self-suffi cient it can be (ignoring science fi ction 
utopias where technology can do everything).  For Aristotle, humans are animals 
that live in complex communities, so they must be social.
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The Cynics would say that humans have lived in complex communities. 
But they can live more simply and more self-suffi ciently too.  The more simply 
you live, the less you must rely on others.  This lack of dependence makes self-
suffi ciency and simplicity mutually supporting.  Schopenhauer magnifi es this 
point by saying that independence is actually the best way to cultivate friendship. 
That you do not need anyone makes you more open to better friendships (1902, 
§28).
Cynical training involves inoculating people against dependence on other 
people for goods like friendship.  Cynic training was called a “shortcut to virtue,” 
a quick path to the destination of fl ourishing.  But like all shortcuts, living the 
Cynic life was grueling and transformed only those who survived. 
 12 Schopenhauer says something similar, “Your friends will tell you that they 
are sincere; your enemies really are so.  Let your enemies’ censure be like a bitter 
medicine, to be used as a means of self-knowledge” (1902, §33). 
 13 I see this same motivation alive in contemporary literature.  Cocking 
and Kennett, for example, mention multiple times that a problem with assessing 
friends with rigorous moral values makes friendship nearly impossible (2000, pp. 
281, 289).  I think Aristotle and the Cynics would both respond: so what? No 
one said friendship would be easy.  But whereas Aristotle would say friendship 
is nonetheless necessary for fl ourishing, the Cynics would say that its risk is why 
they do not include it in fl ourishing. 
 14 “It would be foolish to suggest of those cases where friendship moves us 
against competing moral reasons that we thereby exhibit a lesser friendship or 
realize less of the good of friendship” (Cocking and Kennett, 2000, p. 287). 
 15 I intentionally write “best form of friendship” because it is clear that the 
Aristotelians reference friends of virtue or excellence.  Aristotle is quite happy 
to call other relationships friendships too, whether of pleasure or utility or some 
other quality.  Dean and Carl’s friendship would certainly be a useful friendship. 
But that cannot be the debate here.  For Cocking and Kennett’s argument to go 
through, they need for Dean and Carl’s friendship to be the most superlative form 
of friendship, analogous to virtuous friendship (without the moral component). 
They need people, probably philosophers, to agree that what Dean did for Carl 
is be a “true and good” friend to him (2000, pp. 279-81).  If they do not take this 
route, their paper becomes trivial because Aristotle would agree that Dean and 
Carl are friends, just not of the highest sort.  The distinction and superlativeness 
matter. 
 16 Cynic Bion of Borysthenes echoes the same point, “We should keep a 
close eye on our friends to see what kind of people they are, so that one should 
not be thought to associate with rogues, or to turn away people of worth” (Hard, 
2012, s. 512). 
 17 In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley has a similar insight, “One of the 
principal functions of a friend is to suffer (in a milder and symbolic form) the 
punishments that we should like, but are unable, to infl ict upon our enemies” 
(2006 [1932], p. 179). 
 18 I discussed many of the central ideas in this paper with Scott F. Aikin 
and Robert Engelman, both of whom read a draft of this paper.  I thank them for 
accepting my ideas, fl aws and all, while also helping me with them. 
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